Legislative functions of federal second chambers are not a homogeneous set of powers, but require comparison and classification. First, the paper will examine the legislative functions of the second chambers of those European states that have a federal or quasifederal character (Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom). Second, the paper addresses the normative concept of the legislative functions of federal second chambers: what is the particularly federal rationale behind these legislative powers, and are there other constitutional rationales as well? Do some legislative functions serve purposes of federalism better than others and does a dichotomy between 'weak-form' and 'strong-form' veto powers apply in this context? This will also require some discussion on whether perfect or imperfect bicameralism and the requirements of internal decision-making play a role in this regard.
Introduction
'In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.' I It was James Madison who thus explained bicameralism in federal context. But even earlier than the era of federalism, bicameralism connoted legislatures with two branches (Luther 2006: 3; Shell 2001: 18; Uhr 2008: 474) . In accordance with this concept, the term 'second chamber' does not indicate a qualitative standard -as the terms 'lower' or 'upper' chamber -, but refers to the chronology of legislative processes.
II While it is true that second chambers are today vested with much more than just legislative functions -as indeed first chambers are -, legislation is still what matters most. III This is especially so in the case of federal second chambers, since federalism requires the participation of the component units in the very process that determines, inter alia, their own status and future (Palermo and Kössler 2017: 164) . In states governed by the rule of law, this requires participation in legislation, including, above all, constitutional legislation. But even though there is a plethora of literature on second chambers, including those existing in federal systems, little attention has been paid to their legislative functions as a particular constitutional species that requires a more differentiated analysis.
Legislative functions of federal second chambers are, however, not a homogeneous set of powers, but require comparison and classification, which this paper undertakes. First, an empirical survey will examine the legislative functions of the second chambers of those European states that have a federal or strongly regionalised character (Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom), which is mainly due to the law-making powers of their respective component units.
Moreover, with the exception of the UK's House of Lords (which is still included in this study due to the strong degree of autonomy in the devolved regions), all of these second chambers are organisationally and/or functionally strongly related to the subnational level, even though this may have little impact in political practice. Second, the paper addresses the normative concept of the legislative functions of federal second chambers: what is the particularly federal rationale behind these legislative powers, and are there other constitutional rationales as well? Do some legislative functions serve purposes of federalism better than others and is a dichotomy between 'weak-form' and 'strong-form' veto powers useful in this context? This will also require some discussion on whether perfect or imperfect bicameralism and the requirements of internal decision-making play a role in this regard.
Types of Legislative Functions
In almost all federal states, federal parliaments have a bicameral structure (Watts 2008: 147; 2010: 33-34) ; in some of these states, even the component units' parliaments, or part of them, are bicameral. IV At the federal level, the respective second chamber represents the component units, while the first chamber, as a rule, represents federal citizens directly.
In a majority of cases, second chambers are constitutionally vested with fewer and weaker powers than first chambers (Patterson and Mughan 2001: 41-44) . The same observation applies to federal second chambers, also with regard to their legislative functions (Watts 2010: 39-40) . All federal second chambers participate in legislation to some degree; however, they may or may not have other, non-legislative functions, such as, inter alia, the parliamentary scrutiny of the executive, appointments, impeachment, constitutional interpretation, international treaties, EU affairs or the dissolution of bodies pertaining to the component units (Watts 2008: 153-154; Luther 2006: 25-28; Palermo and Kössler 2017: 193-200) . Their core function nevertheless is legislation.
Legislative functions are sometimes equalised with veto rights in legislative processes.
From a broader perspective, however, there is a much more complex variety of legislative functions, V such as the following:
(1) the right to enact quasi-legislative rules autonomously, which mostly applies to the second chamber's Standing Orders 
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(c) a suspensive veto that is submitted to a mediation committee for final resolution (4) the right to modify bills passed by the first chamber, irrespective of the consequence (5) the right to demand a referendum on a bill passed by the first chamber (6) the right to appeal to (constitutional) courts for the pre-enactment scrutiny of a bill (7) the right to challenge enacted laws before (constitutional) courts
The legislative functions of federal second chambers may have a 'positive' or 'negative' impact on legislation -not in a moral sense, but with regard to the question of whether law is created or abolished (or prevented from being created, respectively).
VI Federal second chambers may thus appear as positive or negative law-making bodies, irrespective of whether their 'positive' or 'negative' act is decisive or not. VII Some of these rights have, however, a Janus-faced character inasmuch as it depends on their exercise whether they contribute to a law in a 'positive' or 'negative' sense. For example, veto rights are mostly connoted as 'negative' legislative function, but this depends on the kind of veto: a suspensive veto could perhaps entail further discussion and a modification of a bill that is ultimately enacted. Vice versa, even the right to initiate legislation which appears to be the paradigm of 'positive' legislation may, in effect, bear a negative character inasmuch as the second chamber could propose a repealing law with the sole effect of abolishing an existing law.
Empirical Survey
The comparison between the federal second chambers selected for this study shows that, even though all of them participate in legislative functions in principle, they usually do not take part in the same type of legislative functions. The core of legislative functions of the compared federal second chambers consists of the right to initiate legislation and the right to veto bills passed by the first chamber. The traditional classification of second chambers as 'strong' or 'weak' is primarily concerned with their veto powers: the more (absolute) veto powers they have, and the wider the fields are to which they apply, the stronger these chambers are considered to be. This assessment emanates from the view that federal second chambers serve to defend and protect the Even a 'mere' suspensive veto, that simply entails a second resolution by the first chamber on whether to uphold the original bill, might stimulate the first chamber to further discuss and reflect on the content of a bill. Weak-form powers of federal second chambers could thus promote the efficiency of legislative procedures, political compromise and cooperation between both chambers. Absolute veto powers amount to a 'yes-no' vote which, depending on the political decision in the second chamber, either absolutely impede or unconditionally accept bills passed by the first chamber. They do not allow for a third option, namely to reflect, discuss and eventually modify such bills. Indirectly, the mere threat of an absolute veto could, however, also motivate the first chamber to pre-consider the second chamber's interests in the early phase of a legislative process. Moreover, federal second chambers might be vested with absolute veto rights and still not use them in order to protect the component units if their political intentions are in line with those of the respective first chambers. XXV And even the exercise of an absolute veto could be followed by a total restart or second stage XXVI of the legislative process.
Weak-form legislative powers are, however, not sufficient safeguards for the protection of component unit interests, since the first chamber may not be willing to enter into negotiations or to reach a compromise with the second chamber if it is not formally required to do so. It largely depends on the concrete political attitudes of both chambers whether suspensive vetoes sufficiently protect component unit interests and whether they really enable serious dialogue between the chambers.
Neither absolute nor suspensive veto powers can, therefore, guarantee that a federal 
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be that absolute veto powers will serve as better protective shields than suspensive veto powers if a federal second chamber wants to use that shield. For the purposes of federalism, moreover, absolute veto powers seem to be advisable at least in cases where the federal constitution is amended or where laws with particular focus on the component units are concerned.
Still, theory on second chambers should be more mindful of the question of what the federal rationale behind federal second chambers really is. If the rationale is more or less understood to be the protection and defense of the component units, veto rights -and, among these, absolute veto rights in particular -will be considered to be the strongest and most important instruments pertaining to a federal second chamber's legislative functions.
Using absolute veto rights, federal second chambers would not even need the power to challenge laws before constitutional courts, because they could perfectly well prevent them from being enacted at all -and, what is more, not just for constitutional reasons. If, however, the federal rationale behind these chambers is rather understood to lie in their active contribution to the design of federal laws (with whatever content) and to advise, reflect or instigate further discussion, the right to initiate bills, the right to propose modifications and, indeed, even 'mere' suspensive veto powers might be seen as the more constructive tool.
XXVII
It would be a misconception, however, to suggest that imperfect bicameralism would be a better option for federal systems than perfect bicameralism. Imperfect bicameralism means that (usually) the second chamber, and (usually) not the first chamber, has fewer and weaker powers (Patterson and Mughan 2001: 41-44) . With regard to legislative powers, this implies that the second chamber has fewer and weaker powers in the legislative process than the first. This deficit may apply to the initiative power as well as the respective type of veto power or any other of the aforementioned legislative functions.
When the Italian Government first proposed its ideas on a new Senate -which was finally rejected by Italian voters in the constitutional referendum of 4 December 2016 -, XXVIII the suggestion was made that the new Senate would be better suited to regional or quasi-federal needs when compared to the prevailing system of perfect bicameralism. 
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of federalism are not served by the mere reduction of a second chamber's powers, even when the remaining powers are embedded in a federal context -unless the 'lost' powers were given to alternative bodies of component representation.
The Federal Rationale behind Legislative Powers of Federal Second Chambers
In federal systems, self-rule, namely the legislative, administrative and judicial competences of the component units, must be accompanied by shared rule.
XXX Shared rule allows the component units to take part in federal legislation on any or at least some matters that affect them particularly. This latter participation is the more important when it comes to federal constitutional law-making or other pieces of federal legislation that E -127 majorities may slow down or even produce deadlocks to the legislative process, since it will be more difficult to reach consensus between the delegates of the component units.
In this context, the direct participation of the component units either instead of or in addition to the involvement of the federal second chamber could be contemplated.
XXXIV
Direct participation means that each individual component unit is allowed to participate in the legislative process, that it has a direct say in the legislative process without being represented by a 'chamber' or similar institution. Normally, the component units in these cases decide on bills passed by the first or even the federal second chamber, but in some countries they may even initiate certain pieces of legislation. XXXV 
Non-federal Rationales Behind Legislative Powers of Federal Second Chambers
Lastly, it should not be forgotten that some non-federal rationales also lie behind the legislative functions of federal second chambers. Probably the most important of these was formulated by James Madison very clearly, namely that the Senate, 'as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government' XLVI doubling 'the security to the people'.
XLVII XLVIII The establishment of a federal second chamber was thus considered to be an 'introduction of legislative balances and checks'. XLIX It is remarkable that second chambers have a stronger position in constitutional amendment procedures than in others, which also gives weight to the rigidity of a constitution (Palermo and Kössler 2017: 178-179).
While non-federal second chambers, too, contribute to an 'internal' separation of powers vis-à-vis the first chamber within the legislative power, a federal second chamber additionally guarantees checks and balances within the vertical separation of powers.
The effectiveness of such checks and balances of course depends on many uncertain factors, such as party politics (Watts 2010: 41-43) or at least to rely on adequate legal services -which is not often the case. LIV Normally, federal second chambers cannot themselves take on the role of quasi-constitutional courts.
Even the Federalist Papers admit that it 'must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial'. Whether the representation of the component peoples follows the same democratic pattern as the composition of the first chamber, may differ from system to system. But even the mandates belonging to a first chamber are not always distributed on a completely proportional basis, depending on the nationwide electoral system. While it is possible, therefore, that the first and second chamber follow different proportions or that a proportional model does not apply for the second chamber at all, it is, at any rate, an additional representative body of peoples and no oligarchic body. II An attribution of 'quality' is rather suggested by the term 'upper house'; see Uhr (2008: 478) . III Watts (2008: 153; 2010: 40) , Palermo and Kössler (2017: 193) . See, with some reservations, Patterson and Mughan (2001: 51-52) and Bradley and Pinelli (2012: 665-667) . IV With examples, Palermo and Kössler (2017: 137) . V In an even wider sense, the right to participate in the ascending phase of EU legislation, the approval of international treaties that amend domestic laws or functions that affect the government or parliaments of the component units (and, indirectly, their legislative powers), such as the notorious Art 155 of the Spanish Constitution or Art 100 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Act, could be mentioned as well, but are neglected for the purposes of this paper. Outside Europe, the Ethiopian House of Federation's power to interpret the constitution in a 'quasi-authentic' manner is worth mentioning. VI See, more generally on 'positive ' and 'negative' lawmaking, Gamper (2016: 14) . VII Kelsen's functional attribution of 'positive lawmaking' to parliaments and 'negative lawmaking' to constitutional courts (Kelsen 1929: 56) is, thus, too little differentiated. VIII A general survey on the functions of federal second chambers is given by Watts (2008: 153-154; 2010: 39-41) and Palermo and Kössler (2017: 178-200) . Palermo and Kössler (2017: 178-193) further distinguish between 'constitutional amendments', 'territorial changes' and 'legislative functions' (apart from other, nonlegislative functions) as primary functions of federal second chambers. But both constitutional amendments and (possibly) territorial changes rely on legislative functions as well. IX Sometimes, these powers are not just those of the federal second chamber as such, but of their individual members or committees; for the purposes of comparison, this difference is neglected here. Russell (2012: 121-126) . XVIII Art 78 para 2 of the Belgian Constitution. XIX Art 90 para 2 of the Spanish Constitution. XX A special case of mediation within the first or second chamber due to its multiethnic composition is constituted by Art IV Sec 3 para d and f of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. XXI Palermo and Kössler (2017: 192-193) . See, more generally, Russell (2012: 126-127 (2017: 182-183) . XL In some cases, however, only the component units (directly) and not the federal second chamber co-decide on federal constitutional amendments; see Palermo and Kössler (2017: 179-183) . XLI See, eg, in Austria: Art 14b para 4, Art 94 para 2, Art 102 para 1 and 4, Art 130 para 2 no 3, Art 131 para 4, Art 135 para 1 B-VG. XLII In some fields of legislation, Art 4 para 3 of the Belgian Constitution, to which other provisions refer, requires a law passed by a majority of the votes cast in each linguistic group in each House, on condition that a majority of the members of each group is present and provided that the total number of votes in favour that are cast in the two linguistic groups is equal to at least two thirds of the votes cast. XLIII Art IV para 2 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to which the House of Representatives shall comprise 42 Members, two-thirds elected from the territory of the Federation, onethird from the territory of the Republika Srpska. XLIV A particularly interesting case is constituted by Art IV Sec 3 para d (see also para e and f, with regard to special majorities in the Second Chamber) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to which the delegates and members shall make 'their best efforts' to see that the majority includes at least onethird of the votes of delegates or members from the territory of each entity. If a majority vote does not include one-third of the votes of delegates or members from the territory of each entity, the chair and deputy chairs shall meet as a commission and attempt to obtain approval within three days of the vote. If those efforts fail, decisions shall be taken by a majority of those present and voting, provided that the dissenting votes do not include two-thirds or more of the delegates or members elected from either entity. XLV See, with more detail, Tierney et al (2017: 222-223 Luther (2006: 21) . LII On the safeguard-function of second chambers in constitutional matters, see also Russell (2011: 61-74) . LIII See James Madison in Federalist No 62: 'Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation.' LIV In an extremely idealistic vision, James Madison (Federalist No 62) expects from a 'well-constituted' senate aids in order to overcome the 'blunders of our governments', 'all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom'. Even though this reflective function of a second chamber seems to be highly-overestimated when compared to bicameralism in practice, it could nevertheless play an important role for good governance. LV Federalist No 62. LVI Art 62 para 1 of the Ethiopian Constitution. See also Watts (2008: 154) . LVII On this critique, Watts (2008: 154; 2010: 43-45) and Uhr (2008: 474) . LVIII Federalist No 62.
